As my long-time readers know, Rebel Fund invests in the top 10% of Y Combinator startups each batch, now with a portfolio of 300+ incredible YC companies. Because our Rebel Theorem 5.0 ML/AL algorithm tracks hundreds of characteristics and outcomes of every YC company and founder in history, we often see shifts in YC startup performance in our data well before they show up in the headlines.
We noticed one particular shift that set off alarm bells — YC startup Series A rounds fell off a cliff starting about 5 years ago:

What happened? Did YC batches get too big? Is YC founder quality not what it used to be? Are macro factors at play? Today’s post sets out to answer this.
Why the Series A rate matters
Unsurprisingly, YC companies that raise a Series A have a dramatically higher survival rate than companies that don’t. According to our data, raising a Series A round cuts a company’s odds of shutting down by nearly 3x, and those that raise a Series C+ have a 10-year survival rate of >95%.

Is YC not what it used to be?
There’s a perpetual meme amongst investors that “YC isn’t what it used to be”. I’ve been hearing this at every YC Demo Day since my own in 2013, but of course it’s no more true now than it was then.
If the 2021 and later batches were simply weaker, we’d expect to see two things in the data: 1) the slowdown would be confined to them, and 2) it would show up in our quality metrics of the founders and companies YC admitted. Neither turned out to be true.
Every batch slowed down in the same year
It turns out that Series A rounds slowed for every YC startup in 2023, regardless of whether they were admitted to YC one, two, or three plus years earlier. A drop in admissions quality around 2021 can’t reach back and slow down a company that went through YC in 2017.

The founders were just as strong
At Rebel, we score every YC startup and founder across hundreds of dimensions using our proprietary Rebel Theorem 5.0 ML/AI model, looking at everything from founder education and work backgrounds, personality traits, archetypes, entrepreneurial track record, founder-product fit, and more.
For this analysis, we used the same data to predict overall Series A rates by batch, and compared that to actual graduation rates. In the chart below, you’ll see that predicted vs actual rates held steady until the end of 2020, and then suddenly the actual rates fell far below what our model predicted:

The slowdown also hit every tier of founder quality about equally.

To me, these are the most striking numbers in the whole analysis. A top-quintile founding team that went through YC in 2022 had worse odds of raising a Series A than a bottom-quintile team from 2018.
The market turned
The sudden slowdown in YC startup Series A rates coincides with interest rates climbing through 2022 and 2023. The pain started at the late stage, but global early-stage funding in late 2022 was down 39% year over year. As Series B and growth investors stopped writing checks, Series A investors lost confidence that their companies could raise the next round and stopped investing as aggressively.
It wasn’t just YC startups. Carta counted 808 Series A rounds in 2023, down about 50% from 1,612 the year before.
So there’s our answer: It was a macroeconomic phenomenon.
So what from here?
Many of the companies still standing from the tough 2021 time period onwards, which have founding teams just as strong as any before them, haven’t raised a Series A simply because the window was closed when they knocked.
However, there are early signs of a thaw. In 2025, the share of young YC companies raising a first Series A recovered to 4.2% for those one year past Demo Day and 7.3% for those two years past, up from 1.5% and 3.0% at the bottom. We’re still at roughly half the pre-2021 norm, so I wouldn’t call it a full recovery yet, but things are trending in the right direction.
The more interesting question is whether thanks to AI, companies will even need to raise a Series A at the same rates as before. In Rebel’s most recent vintages, we’re seeing incredible levels of revenue growth, capital efficiency, and profitability. If these companies can continue to fuel their growth on cash flow alone, they may not even want to raise any post-seed capital.
On the other hand, we’re also seeing companies take on dramatically more ambitious technological challenges than before, which could help maintain their appetite for venture capital after all, but that’s a topic for another blog post.

