It seems the most controversial topic in early-stage venture today is whether a large diversified portfolio strategy (70+ companies) or a small concentrated portfolio strategy (10–20 companies) is better for LPs.
At Rebel Fund, we confidently chose the former, targeting 150+ Y Combinator startups per fund, or the top 10% of YC startups driving ~96% of all investor returns. The math is clear that a large portfolio strategy is superior when investing in YC startups, especially after accounting for risk. However, we still run across many institutional LPs who believe otherwise.
In my previous post on this topic On the power law of Y Combinator startups I share the power law curve that drives YC startup returns, and the results of several Monte Carlo simulations we ran proving that a large portfolio strategy is optimal when it comes to YC startup investing. In this post, I’ll take it a step further with the help of a visual aid that anyone who been to a gun range or Irish pub is familiar with: a bullseye

In this bullseye, each circle represents a different startup valuation range, drawn to scale to illustrate how common each one is amongst Y Combinator startups at least 7+ years old. Rebel Fund maintains the largest database that exists of YC startups, founders & outcomes outside of YC itself, so we’re in a unique position to share these statistics:
Dark red “decacorn” circle → $10B+ valuation (~1% of YC startups, median valuation ~$20B)
Red “unicorn” circle → $1B-$9.9B valuation (~6% of YC startups, median valuation ~$2B)
Pink “$100M+” circle → $100M-$999M valuation (~20% of YC startups, median valuation ~$400M)
Grey “non-outlier” circle → <$100M valuation (~80% of YC startups, median valuation ~$10M)
As a GP, my job is to fire shots at this bullseye that land as close to the center as possible. The bad news for me is that hitting the red circles is very difficult, but the good news is the payoff is huge when I hit them.
Below are estimated net return multiples for a YC startup investor hitting each circle, assuming a median ~$20M entry valuation and ~50% dilution to exit:
Dark red “decacorn” circle → ~500x
Red “unicorn” circle → ~50x
Pink “$100M+” circle → ~10x
Grey “non-outlier” circle —> ~0x (to be conservative)
I based these return multiples on median rather than average outcomes to be conservative, as averages are much higher due to the mega-outliers.
To help illustrate what different portfolio strategies (i.e., number of shots fired) mean for LPs, I built a Python script that generates customized bullseyes based on various inputs around the investment universe, and randomly fires shots at it based on certain portfolio size and investment accuracy assumptions. Each bullseye essentially shows a single trial of a Monte Carlo simulation as featured in my power law post, but I think this visual will make it easier for non-statisticians to understand.

This first bullseye illustrates our portfolio strategy at Rebel. We make 150+ investments per fund, exclusively in YC startups, and I’ve assumed conservatively our accuracy is 10% on a scale from 0% (same as chance) → 100% (perfection).
In this simulation, even though ~70% of our shots don’t hit the mark, we still hit 4 decacorns, 10 unicorns, and twenty-nine $100M+ companies, resulting in an ~18x overall net return multiple — not bad!
Now, let’s compare that with more concentrated, but still YC-focused investment strategy:

This bullseye includes only 10 investments in YC startups, with the same 10% accuracy assumption as above.
In this simulation, again ~70% of the shots landed in the grey, but there were 2 unicorn investments and one $100M+ company investment, resulting in an 11x net return multiple — still quite good!
What’s interesting about this simulation is the unicorn rate was very lucky at 20%, over 3x the YC average, yet it still underperformed Rebel’s large portfolio strategy. The reason is that no decacorns were hit, which is unsurprising since they’re just ~1% of YC startups — a hard mark to hit with just 10 shots. Even worse, if just one of those unicorn hits landed in the grey, the net return multiple would be cut in half... it’s a fragile portfolio.
Next let’s see what happens if the investment universe is different.
Outside of YC, the venture-backed startup unicorn rate is 1%-2% according to our research. Let’s peg it at 1.5% and generously assume the ratio of decacorns to unicorns to $100M+ companies is the same as in YC. We’ll also generously assume net return multiples for each outcome category are twice as high since entry valuations are about half of YC companies’.

Now that our investment universe is non-YC, the red circles are much smaller, so even with the same 150 shots and 10% accuracy, the results are much worse, even after accounting for the lower entry valuations.
In this simulation there were no decacorn hits, 3 unicorn hits, and 10 hits of $100M+ companies — all in line with what we’d expect to see statistically. The net return multiple is ~3x, which is fairly typical for a generalist diversified seed fund.
This bullseye highlights why a portfolio strategy that works very well in one investment universe, elite YC startups, may not work well in another.
Now let’s see what happens if our non-YC seed investor only takes 10 shots.

The only difference between this simulation and the previous one is the number of shots fired, but the results look dramatically different.
In this simulation, there were no decacorns or unicorns hit despite the same investor accuracy assumption as before, simply because it’s unlikely to hit such a small target with just 10 shots. This investor hit a single $100M+ company to help generate a 2x overall net return multiple, which is enough to return LP capital after fees, but nothing to write home about.
Ironically, it’s perfectly rational for an emerging manager to assume the higher risk of a concentrated portfolio strategy even knowing that its expected returns are worse than with a diversified portfolio strategy. Why?
Because if he somehow beats the odds and hits a couple of unicorns (or especially a decacorn) with just 10–20 investments, then his performance is spectacular and he can easily raise another couple funds off that early success. If he doesn’t beat the odds and his returns are mediocre, then he still walks away with a couple million in management fees, plus it’s much easier to make 10–20 investments than 100+ per fund. Don’t shoot the messenger 😂
In all the bullseyes shared thus far, I kept investor accuracy constant at 10%. However in the real world this is an important variable, with a major impact on the ideal portfolio strategy for a given investor.
Let’s imagine I have a god-like ability to see the future and my investor accuracy is 100%. Then I would make exactly one investment in each YC batch in the biggest decacorn and my bullseye would look like this:

In this happy scenario, all of my ultra-concentrated funds return over 500x and I ride off into the sunset in a private jet of solid gold. Of course this is a fantasy, and not just because gold is too soft and heavy for jet construction.
No mortal can predict which seed-stage startups will become unicorns, much less decacorns, with a high degree of accuracy. At Rebel, we have the world’s most sophisticated ML/AI algorithm for predicting YC startup success, Rebel Theorem 4.0, with hundreds of features trained on millions of YC data points, plus a team of famous YC unicorn founders as partners, and we still miss great YC startups all the time.
The best any investor can hope for at the seed stage is to outperform averages for their target investment universe, and most importantly, avoid adverse selection, which is the real killer of seed portfolios. You would think the worst an investor’s accuracy can be is 0 (i.e., same as chance) but that’s not true at all. It can easily go negative thanks to adverse selection.
Imagine you show up to YC Demo Day for the first time with a fat checkbook and high hopes for investing in tomorrow’s decacorns. Let’s also assume you’ve read this blog post and know the importance of portfolio diversification, so you’re ready to invest in 20 startups in just that YC batch.
Assuming zero skill (i.e., investor accuracy) but perfect deal access, we’d expect about about one of your investments to turn into unicorns, a couple to turn into $100M+ companies, and the rest to be non-outliers. In other words, your bullseye for that batch should look something like this:

However, since the top startups in each YC batch end up with heavily oversubscribed rounds, the founders get to choose their investors, and they’re probably not going to choose an unknown investor who can’t add significant value to their company beyond capital. So, your effective investor accuracy is negative, and your bullseye may actually look like this:

In this unfortunate but common scenario, your investor return is zero, despite having done nothing wrong in terms of selection. In fact, adverse selection is so dangerous that even the best shooting skills in the world can’t overcome it.
That’s why I built Rebel Fund from the ground up to optimize for deal access. Every choice I made in the early days, from partner selection to portfolio support to target check size to investment timing, was made to assure we get into every YC company we want. It’s paid off — after hundreds of investments our deal win rate is nearly 100%.
I could generate more bullseyes to show the pros and cons of different portfolio strategies across different investment universes and even stages (Series A, Series B, etc) but since I’ve open-sourced my Python script, you can do so yourself.
Now let me address some questions that anticipate hearing from institutional LPs who read this post:
What about investor ownership targets? Doesn’t that matter too?
Nope. There is no difference in any fund performance metric (IRR, TVPI, MOIC, DPI, etc) between a smaller fund that owns 2% or a larger fund that owns 20% of the same underlying portfolio companies on the same deal terms. At the end of the day, all that matters is the number of investments (i.e., risk) and average net return multiple (i.e., return). My cynical take is fund managers only have minimum ownership targets to justify a larger fund size → more management fees.
We invest across 20 venture funds. If each of them only invests in 10–20 companies, don’t we get enough diversification across the 200–400 combined underlying portfolio companies?
Your venture portfolio performance is the weighted average of all your individual fund investments, so you every fund you invest in should have the optimal portfolio strategy for their investment universe, stage, and GP skill/access level (i.e., investor accuracy). A bunch of sub-optimal portfolio strategies don’t magically become optimal once combined.
Yes, if you invest in a bunch of a concentrated portfolio funds then it’s possible that a few lucky GPs could carry the rest, but why take the risk? It’s safer to simply optimize the quality of every fund investment you make, and a big part of that is “portfolio strategy fit” for their unique thesis.
If we invest across 20 venture funds with diversified portfolio strategies, we’d have thousands of underlying portfolio companies. How can I can I outperform the venture market and keep my job with so much diversification?
There are over 3,000 venture funds in the US alone, and you want to invest in what… 20 of them? You couldn’t “index” the venture market even if you tried. Besides, every venture fund has its own unique thesis, investment universe, manager skill & biases, etc. all bringing you unique exposure.
But [insert famous fund] had a concentrated portfolio strategy and returned [insert amazing multiple] to LPs! How could that be if a diversified portfolio strategy is superior?
Of course, if a manager only makes 10–20 investments and a few of them land in the center rings of the bullseye, their numbers are fantastic. Just remember how small those red rings are and how inherently unpredictable startup outcomes are at the seed stage.
Some managers have done it for sure, but how much of it was luck? Any LP who has watched a manager’s performance dwindle from Fund I to Fund II to Fund III knows the answer to that question. Better to play the odds and bet on sound portfolio strategies over a few lucky GPs.
What if a fund has a concentrated portfolio strategy with a massive reserve for follow-on investments? Can they reduce risk by concentrating capital in their big winners all the way to IPO?
This is a strategy that looks great on paper but rarely works in the real world, because it relies on the following assumptions:
The fund invests in big winners to start (unlikely with few investments)
The GPs know who their big winners are early on
The fund is able to keep re-investing in every growth round
I’ve seen few examples of this working in practice, and even when it does, is it really a seed fund if most of the capital goes into growth rounds? There’s nothing wrong with growth funds of course, so long as they’re marketed at such.
The bullseyes you shared are just sample portfolios. How can you reach conclusions based on just a few simulations?
Believe me, the statistician in me hates a sample size of n=1. The proper way to test different portfolio strategies is by running Monte Carlo simulations across thousands of trials, which is exactly what we did to develop Rebel’s portfolio strategy, as explained in my power law post. For this post, I opted for understandability over robustness, though I tried to choose bullseyes that are “typical” for each portfolio strategy.
I suppose this is a good place to wrap up this post. If you’re an LP, hopefully you’ll think about the “bullseye” for every fund you diligence. If you’re a GP, perhaps this can help you think through the right portfolio strategy for your fund. If you’re a founder, you only get one “shot” so make it count!

